The US’ lack of commitment to nuclear arms treaties ushers in a shakier world
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By Richard Haass / NEW YORK
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The countries and people of the world have lived with nuclear weapons for eight decades. These vastly destructive weapons have been used only twice, when the US dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end World War II.
There were subsequent scares, most notably the Cuban Missile Crisis. For the most part, nuclear weapons largely remained in the background during the Cold War. The US and the Soviet Union (followed by Russia) built robust arsenals that minimized any advantage to striking first. Alongside deterrence predicated on mutual assured destruction, arms-control agreements provided governments with the transparency and predictability they needed to avoid costly and dangerous arms races.
This has all taken on increased relevance as New START, the nuclear arms control accord limiting the arsenals of the US and Russia, expired last week. It was Russian President Vladimir Putin, of all people, who offered to extend it informally (it was already extended once five years ago), but US President Donald Trump has been cavalier, saying: “If it expires, it expires.”
Illustration: Tania Chou
One reported explanation for the US stance is its unhappiness that China is not included in the formal architecture of arms control. Yes, China possesses the world’s third-largest and fastest-growing nuclear arsenal, but its desire to achieve parity with the US and Russia means it will not sign any pact limiting it to second-class status.
China, considering Taiwan, might well believe that a principal reason the US has not directly come to Ukraine’s defense is respect for Russian nuclear strength.
But there is a strong case for bringing China into arms control a decade hence — and a reasonable chance of doing so.
The non-extension of New START, although unfortunate, is not the end of the world. Neither the US nor Russia wants a new, costly and dangerous arms race. There could be modernization and expansion of arsenals, but it is quite possible a degree of transparency, signaling and even stability could remain in place — and that a new, formal pact would ultimately be negotiated.
Limiting the vertical proliferation of nuclear-weapons countries — the expansion of arsenals — might not be the biggest challenge in the nuclear realm. Of course, it is worrisome in cases such as North Korea, India and Pakistan, because the conditions that have underwritten US/Soviet and US/Russian deterrence would not be easily replicated.
But arguably more troubling is horizontal proliferation: additional countries seeking to join the nine countries that are known to possess nuclear arms: the five (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) formally recognized as “Nuclear-Weapons States” under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea.
One would-be nuclear-weapons state is Iran. Israeli and US military strikes last year set Iran’s program back, but did not reduce its ambitions. On the contrary, the inability to deter the attacks might well have increased Iran’s determination to press ahead.
It remains to be seen what the talks underway in Oman or further military action can accomplish. A nuclear-armed Iran might be more aggressive in its use of proxy forces throughout the region. And it could prompt other countries in the region, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to develop or acquire nuclear weapons of their own. The prospect of the world’s least stable region bristling with nuclear weapons is chilling.
For countries in Europe and Asia, two other factors are increasing their interest in nuclear weapons. One is concern about the threats posed by Russia, China and North Korea. Russia invaded Ukraine and has talked menacingly about using nuclear weapons and altering the political map of Europe. North Korea has never given up its aim of gaining control over the entire Korean Peninsula. China seeks to assert its control over Taiwan and its primacy in the region.
Growing concern about the ambitions, intentions and capabilities of countries that seek fundamental changes to geopolitical arrangements dovetails with increasing doubts about whether the US would continue to provide deterrence against such threats. Alliances have been a successful nonproliferation tool for decades, but the Trump administration has shaken US commitments. The alternative to dependence on the US for many — for South Korea and Japan in Asia and for any number of countries in Europe — would be nuclear self-reliance.
The main risk is that a country developing or acquiring nuclear weapons might provoke a preemptive attack by a neighbor that is not prepared to see a perceived adversary become so threatening. And even if such a transition can take place without leading to war, small nuclear forces might invite an attack in a crisis — or their early introduction (“better to use them before you lose them”) before they are attacked and destroyed.
We need to alter our thinking about nuclear weapons. We have grown too comfortable with them. The time to become uncomfortable has arrived.
Richard Haass, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, is a senior counselor at Centerview Partners, distinguished university scholar at New York University and the author of the weekly Substack newsletter Home & Away.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
