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By Wang Hao 汪浩
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The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) last month officially announced that Zhang Yuxia (張又俠), vice chairman of the CCP’s Central Military Commission (CMC), as well as General Liu Zhenli (劉振立), chief of staff of the CMC’s Joint Staff Department, were being investigated for suspected contraventions of the law, confirming speculation in the rest of the world that China had purged more high-level military personnel.
The purge was not just an anti-corruption campaign, but also a blatant political security operation. For Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), the military is not professional armed forces, but the final insurance policy of his regime. Any officials who do not pledge “absolute loyalty” to him must be eliminated.
Serving as the first vice chairman of the CMC, Zhang was only subordinate to Xi, while Liu controlled the commission’s pivotal joint staff affairs. Both being investigated at the same time showed that Xi has completely lost trust in the chain of military command.
Even if there is no clear sign of a substantial coup d’etat, as long as there is a potential uncontrollable risk, it is enough to trigger his logic of “striking first to gain an upper hand.”
This is the governance model of “better to kill 100 by mistake than to spare one who is guilty.”
Such a governance model might lead to a chilling effect instead of stability — officers are only loyal to individuals, the decisionmaking process becomes conservative and rigid, and military professionalism is replaced by political loyalty.
Internal unrest does not necessarily reduce the risk of external conflict, while it might prompt the leadership to shift internal pressure through tougher external measures.
As for Taiwan, the key is not betting on the direction of Beijing’s power struggles. It lies in recognizing that when the CCP uses its military as a political tool, uncertainty over regional security only increases.
Wang Hao is a political commentator.
Translated by Eddy Chang
