An ambitious megaproject could bring water to parched Central Asia. Will the nations involved be able to manage it?
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By Djoomart Otorbaev
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For decades, the idea of redirecting a small share of Siberia’s vast freshwater resources toward Central Asia has been considered a relic of Soviet-era ambition. The proposal has gained renewed interest, as the underlying realities have changed. Central Asia’s water crisis is rapidly becoming existential, while Russia’s water surplus has increased to such an extent that it poses environmental risks of its own.
The convergence of climate, economic and geopolitical crises, together with technological advances, has transformed this once-impractical proposal into an urgent policy priority. The Earth Sciences Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences announced plans to assess the feasibility of redirecting 1 to 2 percent of the Ob River’s annual flow to Central Asia.
This figure is deliberately modest. Siberian rivers discharge roughly 3,000 cubic kilometers (792 trillion gallons) of freshwater into the Arctic Ocean, and the proposed diversion — about 20 to 70 cubic kilometers — would have virtually no impact on Russia’s vast water reserves. For countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, it could be transformative.
The scientific rationale for such a project is straightforward. Climate change has steadily increased Siberian river runoff by roughly six cubic kilometers per year, accelerating Arctic ice melt, coastal erosion and permafrost thaw. Consequently, Russia finds itself in a paradoxical situation: An overabundance of water in the north, while its southern regions — particularly the Volga basin — are growing increasingly dry.
Central Asia is approaching an ecological tipping point. Glaciers in the Pamir and Tian Shan mountain ranges, responsible for up to 80 percent of the region’s river flow, are melting at unprecedented rates. By 2050, glacial meltwater could fall by 30 to 40 percent, disrupting agriculture, hydropower generation and drinking water supplies.
The problem is compounded by population growth, which is expected to increase electricity demand significantly by 2030. Without structural solutions to the deepening water crisis, economic and political instability is not a hypothetical risk — it is a statistical inevitability.
Russian scientists argue that the technical obstacles that doomed similar Soviet proposals in the 1970s and 1980s no longer apply. Rather than massive open canals prone to evaporation, salinization and contamination, plans envision closed-loop pressure pipelines made of high-diameter polyethylene or composite materials.
Such systems could limit water loss to roughly 3 percent and mitigate environmental risks. In its initial stage, a network of seven pipelines, each about 2,100km long, could deliver up to 5.5 billion cubic meters of water per year. If expanded, the system could carry 15 billion to 20 billion cubic meters annually, still less than 1.6 percent of the Ob River’s total flow.
Global precedents show that mega-aqueducts are costly but entirely feasible. Libya’s Great Man-Made River, for example, transports 6.5 million cubic meters per day under extreme desert conditions. California and Saudi Arabia use long-distance, high-volume pipelines. These systems had to overcome not only major engineering challenges but also enormous energy requirements.
Given Central Asia’s diverse terrain, securing a stable power source would significantly enhance the project’s economic viability. One option would be to build a nuclear power plant dedicated to meeting growing energy demand. Modern reactors produce 1.2 to 1.6 gigawatts of electricity — enough to slash operating costs and provide long-term energy security.
A nuclear-based energy model is technically plausible and economically compelling. Russia is already the world’s largest exporter of nuclear power plants, while Uzbekistan has signed preliminary agreements for civilian nuclear cooperation. Kazakhstan, by contrast, is still weighing whether to adopt nuclear power.
The financial costs would be substantial. Early estimates place the project’s capital costs at US$100 billion, although geopolitical constraints, construction challenges and material requirements could push the final price much higher. Annual operating costs are expected to total US$700 million to US$1.5 billion, driven primarily by the electricity needed to power dozens of pumping stations.
Mobilizing the capital would require a combination of sovereign commitments, development-bank lending, climate-transition funding and possibly the creation of a dedicated Eurasian financing mechanism.
The biggest obstacle is not technological or financial: It is political. Eurasian history is littered with failed infrastructure initiatives. A project of this scale would require coordinated leadership, comprehensive water-management arrangements, environmental guarantees and long-term tariff agreements. Russia would need to commit to a multi-decade hydrological partnership, while Central Asia would have to articulate a unified regional position — a rare occurrence in its modern history.
If implemented successfully, the Ob River project could usher in a new era of Eurasian integration rooted in shared water infrastructure and strategic interests. Without such an intervention, Central Asia risks drifting toward a water crisis that would undermine its economic, social and political stability for decades. The question is not whether the project is technically feasible; it is whether leaders can act in time to spare the region a catastrophe entirely of its own making.
Djoomart Otorbaev, a former prime minister of Kyrgyzstan, is the author of Central Asia’s Economic Rebirth in the Shadow of the New Great Game.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
