Following a series of suspected sabotage attacks by Chinese vessels on undersea cables in the Baltic Sea last year, which impacted Europe’s communications and energy infrastructure, an international undersea cable off the coast of Yehliu (野柳) near Keelung was on Friday last week cut by a Chinese freighter.
Four cores of the international submarine communication cable connecting Taiwan and the US were damaged. The Coast Guard Administration (CGA) dispatched a ship to the site after receiving a report from Chunghwa Telecom and located the Shunxin-39, a Cameroon-flagged cargo ship operated by a Hong Kong-registered company and owned by a Chinese citizen, 13km north of Yehliu that day.
Tracking data from the ship’s Automatic Identification System and satellite transmissions showed the ship had sailed around Taiwan’s northeastern coast since early December and finally anchored near where the cable was cut. The CGA demanded the Shunxin-39, which headed to South Korea after the incident, return to Taiwan’s waters for further investigation.
But according to CGA, the cargo ship with seven crew members all Chinese has stopped transmitting its location on the high seas after leaving Taiwan’s water, a move violating maritime rules.
This incident is not an isolated incident involving undersea cables near Taiwan being deliberately cut. According to the CGA, there were in the past five years 51 reported cases of sabotage on 14 international submarine communication cables connecting Taiwan with other countries, and more than 36 incidents affecting the country’s 10 domestic cables connecting Taiwan proper with outlying islands. Most cases were attributed to misconduct of Chinese civilian vessels such as fishing boats, sand dredgers and commercial ships.
This incident also mirrored security challenges faced by European countries over the past year. The Balticconnector natural gas pipeline and telecom cables between Finland and Estonia were damaged in October 2023 by the anchor of a Hong Kong-flagged Chinese vessel named Newnew Polar Bear. Two more cables, one running from Finland to Germany and another from Lithuania to Sweden, were severed in Swedish waters after the China-registered cargo ship Yi Peng 3 sailed over the cables in November last year. Investigators reportedly believed the ship had dragged its anchor for more than 161km across the Baltic seabed.
All those cases highlight potential maritime warfare threatening the safety of vulnerable undersea cables that carry more than 90 percent of global Internet traffic and critical energy transmission.
Given that China has a long history of sabotaging Taiwan and other rival countries’ critical infrastructure using cyberattacks and maritime tactics, the escalating sabotage of submarine cables could be a part of China’s expanded hybrid warfare, linking civilian entities with its escalating “gray zone” attacks. Those could aim to disturb and weaken the targeted nation’s military capability, readiness and force projection, and isolate the target from international communications, as preparation for a possible blockade or military invasion.
In February 2023, two undersea cables connecting Taiwan with outlying Lienchiang County were damaged by Chinese ships, limiting the access of the county’s 13,000 residents to the Internet for two months, in what has been described as an “invisible blockade.”
Cable sabotage is a threat to maritime stability and a challenge to the safety of international communications. In response, the Quad — a grouping of the US, Australia, India and Japan — in 2023 initiated the Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience to protect Indo-Pacific cables. NATO and European countries have vowed to enhance joint maritime patrols and military presence in the Baltic Sea and other waters for the security of undersea infrastructure.
In Taiwan, the government is set to construct new submarine cables and launch satellites to strengthen the resilience of domestic and transnational communications networks. Considering that any damage to cables in Taiwan’s waters could affect all countries, the nation should pursue further cooperation with international organizations, such as sharing information and developing cross-border contingencies, to enhance maritime security.
